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Abstract  
 Since its enactment on July 2009, Ethiopia’s anti-terrorism 
proclamation is at the very center of almost every political discourse in the 
nation. Many dissidents fall into its trap and by day its effect is becoming 
more far-reaching and resonating. The widely written provisions of the law 
make it susceptible to misapplication and prone to abuse.  Whilst the state is 
staunchly firing back to the detractors of the law and its mis(application) 
alike, however, simultaneously it doubled down utilizing it, by every new 
day. This paper, after examining one hundred twenty three terrorism charges 
pressed against nearly one thousand individuals―in a sixty-six months 
period of time―concludes that: Ethiopia’s anti-terrorism  law is a colossal 
failure for counterterrorism, which only exemplifies how not to counter 
terrorism.  
 
Keywords: Anti-terrorism law, Counterterrorism, Dissidents, Ethiopia, 
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Introduction  
 ‘Terrorism’ and ‘the global war on terror’, alias Overseas 
Contingency Operations—defined and crafted the zeitgeist of the first two 
decades of the 21st century. Terrorism is becoming a must-have ingredient of 
foreign policy, criminal justice administrations, and daily news stories—
around the globe. Especially, since after the September 11, 2001, terrorist 
attack on one of the most powerful nations in the world, the United States of 
America, every aspect of interstate as well intrastate relations changed—in a 
way that mainly guided by the narrative of terrorism, an act which lacks a 
universally-agreed comprehensive definition, but demonstrates hostility and 
evil motives. In other words, the 21st century is “the age of [t]errorism”1.   
                                                            
1Anthony Nocella and Steve Best (2004), Terrorists or Freedom Fighters? Reflections on 
the Liberation of Animals. 
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 Terrorism redefined foreign policies, geopolitical interests, and 
security concerns. Currently, it is seldom to find a state which had not 
devised a counterterrorism strategy—whether in a Criminal Justice Model or 
the Intelligence Model or the War Model. Boots are deployed in many parts 
of the world to hunt terrorists; tens of thousands are locked in jail—hence 
states can stop terrorists from ‘disrupting the public order’—and billions of 
dollars are invested every year in security projects.  
 Nevertheless, in spite of that terrorism is becoming a household 
name, defining and explaining it is/was appeared to be a daunting task. Long 
before the post-2001 global ‘war on terror’ was waged, terrorism was already 
recognized as ‘a fad word’2. In 1980, in answering the question of ‘What is 
Terrorism?’, Brian Jenkins aptly pointed how our perspective affects our 
understanding of it as “[t]hus seems to depend on one's point of view. Use of 
the term [terrorism] implies a moral judgment; and if one party can 
successfully attach the label terrorist to its opponent, then it has indirectly 
persuaded others to adopt its moral view point”. This pejorative3 
understanding of the term makes the scholarly as well as the political effort 
of defining it almost impossible. Minding this ‘definitional vacuum’4 the 
International community—led by the United Nations (hereinafter the UN)—
delegates the power of defining terrorism to member states through their 
domestic laws. 
 Ethiopia was among one of the member states who took this 
delegated chance to mount on the fast-wheeling ‘war on terror’ bandwagon. 
After many years of deliberation5 and numerous critical reports from 
different entities, Ethiopia finally adopts its Anti-terrorism Proclamation 
(hereinafter the ATP) on uly 2009. In spite of the fierce resistance from 
different domestic and international bodies that the law is sweeping in nature 
and draconian6, the Ethiopian government justifies the enactment of the bill 
                                                            
2 Brian Michael Jenkins (1980), The Study Of Terrorism: Definitional Problems, The Rand 
Corporation.  
3 Bruce Hoffman (2006), Inside Terrorism, Colombia University 
4 Scholars of numerous disciplines uses different phrases that are indicative of the difficulty 
in defining terrorism inter alia, ‘definitional impasse’, ‘definitional failure’, ‘definitional 
vacuum’, ‘semantic chaos’, ‘semantic swamp’, and etcetera are used by various experts of 
terrorism. For more on this see, Grozdanova, R. (2014), Terrorism’ – Too Elusive a Term 
for an International Legal Definition? Netherlands International Law Review, 61(3), 305-
334. 
5 See Country Reports on Human Rights, US State department, Bureau of Democracy, 
Human Rights and Labor for the year 2004, 2006 and 2007, available at 
https://www.state.gov/j/drl/rls/hrrpt/ 
6 Among others, see Human Rights Watch (2009), Analysis of Ethiopia’s Draft Anti-
Terrorism Law, Article 19 (2009), Comment on Anti-Terrorism Proclamation, Committee to 
Protect Journalists (2009), Anti-terrorism legislation further restricts Ethiopian press, and 
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as an essential counterterrorism tool7. By proscribing three Ethiopian 
political insurgent groups—Oromo Liberation Front (hereinafter OLF), 
Ogaden National Liberation Front (hereinafter ONLF), and Ginbot 7 for 
Justice, Freedom and Democracy (hereinafter Ginbot 7) along with two 
international terrorist groups—Al-Qaeda and Al-Shabaab—on June 2011, 
the state took the longest leap to implement the ATP. Since then, the 
victims/targets—perspective wise relatively different adjectives used by 
different entities—of the ATP are snowballing and that eventually makes the 
applicability of the law vague at its best and preposterous at worst.  
 Beyond merely witnessing the mis(application) of the law, there are 
several reasons that motivate the author of this paper to explore the 
applicability of the ATP. The first and the foremost one is, sheer 
nonexistence of academic works with regard to the implementation of the 
law. Although there are some works done discussing the constitutionality of 
the ATP, its sweeping approach of painting dissent in a broad brush, and 
how it ill-defined terrorism and potentially causing abuse8, however, so far, 
there is no academic study answering the question of how the ATP was/is 
implemented―aimed at weigh the vindication or disapproval of its the 
proponents or critics respectively. Hence, this work takes a new approach by 
studying Ethiopia’s anti-terrorism  law from the practical point of view. For 
that end, the author studied one hundred twenty three separate court cases, 
which constitute nine hundred eighty five individuals/legal persons in the 
sixty six months period—stretched from September, 2011 to March 2017—
and tries to shade a light on the law, its application as well as its implication 
on the future of dissent and counterterrorism in Ethiopia.  
 Secondly, the fact that author of this work himself was once a victim 
of ATP, gives him a chance to closely look and monitor the implementation 
of it and urges to do this research. For that matter, the data collection for this 
research was started while the author was in prison.  
                                                                                                                                                        
Amnesty International (2009),  Ethiopia: New Anti-Terrorism Proclamation Jeopardizes 
Freedom Of Expression. 
7 Minutes of the public discussion on the draft of Ethiopia’s Antiterrorism law (June 2009) 
as quoted by Hiruy Wube “Some Points on the Ethiopian Anti-terrorism Law from Human 
Rights Perspective” Journal of Ethiopian Law, Vol, 25 No.2, pp.43-46 
8 See Peter Sekyere and Bossman Asare, An Examination Of Ethiopia’s Anti -Terrorism 
Proclamation On Fundamental Human Rights (2016), Dersolegn Yeneabt Mekonen, 
Assessing Controversial Issues of the Ethiopian Anti-Terrorism Law: A Special Focus on 
Substantive Matters (2015),Hiruy Wubie, Some Points on the Ethiopian Anti-Terrorism Law 
from Human Rights Perspective (2012),  Wondwossen Demissie Kassa, The Scope of 
Definition of a Terrorist Act under Ethiopian Law: Appraisal of its Compatibility with 
Regional and International Counterterrorism Instruments (2014),  Asmelash Yohannes 
Teklu, Enhancing Human Rights Protection and National Security by Proscribing a 
‘Terrorist’ Organisation: the Ethiopian Dilemma (2016), and etcetera. 
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 Thirdly and most importantly, the ever-heating and fierce debate on 
the use and abuse the ATP in Ethiopia motivates the author to delve the 
debate deep and shade a light on the story. The current ruling elite in 
Ethiopia justifies the necessity of the law—since its early age of drafting—as 
a western adapted important counterterrorism tool. Contrarily, detractors of 
the law posit a critical view of it—by analyzing the substantive and 
procedural components of the proclamation—as a legal monster which was 
cunningly crafted to curtail political dissent and to gag opposing voices.  
 Cognizant of the academic loophole, along with aforementioned 
rationales, the author exerts his effort to weigh the implementation of the 
ATP since its enactment and tries to pinpoint the flaws implicated.   
 
Let States fill the ‘Definitional Vacuum’9 
 Terrorism is neither a recent phenomenon nor an act that surrenders 
for ‘the tyranny of geography’. Although, its ubiquity and universal nature 
makes it seem easy to grasp, nonetheless, defining terrorism—especially 
defining it for legal purposes—has never been an easy task and it continued 
to be painstaking. Inter alia, this basically resulted from the pejorative 
assertion of the term itself. The Political Philosopher Tomis Kaptian rightly 
observed the danger of the ‘terrorist’ label and its pejorative tone: 
Because of its negative connotation, the “terrorist” label discredits any 
individuals or groups to which it is affixed. It dehumanizes them, places 
them outside the norms of acceptable social and political behavior, and 
portrays them as people who cannot be reasoned with.10 
 This takes us to the conclusion that because of its entire negative 
connotational semantic assertion, defining terrorism in a comprehensive 
manner is a task that seems never yield a result. That is why some scholars 
takes this unending battle to the extent of suggesting to leave the ‘semantic 
chaos’11 alone and deal with the threat itself. In beating this drum, two 
decades ago, Rosalyn Higgins, a judge to the International Court of Justice—
enunciated that “[t]errorism [a]s a term without any legal significance. It is 
merely a convenient way of alluding to activities, whether of States or of 
individuals, widely disapproved of and in which either the methods used are 
unlawful, or the targets protected, or both”12. 
 Unless there is an agreeable stance over it—at least to a certain 
extent—however, dealing with the threat is an impossible mission. After all, 
                                                            
9 See Supra 4 
10 Tomis Kaptian, Can Terrorism be Justified? in Richard Fumerton and Diane Jeske, eds. 
Readings in Political Philosophy (Broadview Press, 2011), 1068-1087 
11 See Supra 1 
12 Rosalyn Higgins, ‘The General International Law of Terrorism’ in Rosalyn Higgins and 
Maurice Flory (eds), Terrorism and International Law (1997) 14, 28.  
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the fight against terrorism begins with identifying who is a terrorist and who 
is not13.  
 The quarrel over defining terrorism does not confine itself in the 
academic and legal arena, rather it transcends to States as well as the 
International political and diplomatic arena. Globally, roughly for the last 
fifty years—since the first United Nations convention on terrorism adopted 
in 196314—the UN was/is embattling over an all agreed definition of 
terrorism, in which it was not able to leap beyond specific working 
definitions adopted on sporadic and piecemeal legal instruments. 
Consequently, the international body refrained—until now—from adopting a 
comprehensive and mandatory definition of terrorism.15 Hence, in spite of 
the plethora of International legal instruments on terrorism, we lacked an 
inclusive and workable definition of it on the one hand, and a common 
understanding of the act itself on the other hand. This results multitude16 of 
academic and legal definitions proposed and asserted by different actors—
including individuals, states, International bodies, and so forth.  
 Among others, Sir Jeremy Greenstock, the former British 
Ambassador to the UN simplistically suggests a circular definition of 
terrorism as, “[W]hat looks, smells, and kills like terrorism, is terrorism”. 
                                                            
13 Alex Schmid in his work Terrorism - The Definitional Problem summed this definitional 
squabble as “Brian Jenkins (RAND Corporation), one of the first researchers in the field of 
terrorism, has called the definition problem the "Bermuda Triangle of terrorism." The late 
Bowyer Bell (MIT), in turn, held "tell me what you think about terrorism, and I tell you who 
you are. Philip Schlesinger, a British sociologist, even argued "....that no commonly agreed 
definition can in principle be reached, because the very process of definition is in itself part 
of a wider contestation over ideologies or political objectives.” 
14 Ben Saul (2006) on The Legal Response of the League of Nations to Terrorism published 
at the Journal of International Criminal Justice discussed the status of terrorism during the 
era of League of Nations in further details.  
15 Nothing testifies the challenge of defining terrorism as the United Nations Model 
Legislative Provisions against Terrorism adopted on February 2009. The Model provisions 
are meant to be suggesting states—without imposing on them—a comprehensive definition 
of terrorism and related activities. Nonetheless, the Model proposed six different definitions 
of a ‘terrorist act’ and let/recommend states to pick their own preferred definition. 
Disclaiming the nature of its proposed definition, the proposal underlines that “States are 
reminded that they ARE NOT BOUND by any UN instrument to define ‘terrorist acts’. […] 
Accordingly, [States] can change, expand or restrict the proposed definitions in accordance 
with their specific needs, or taking into account alternative definitions. In departing from the 
proposed formulation, however, particular attention should be given to ensuring that chosen 
language is sufficiently precise and unambiguous to suit criminal law drafting 
requirements.” 
16 In 1988 Alex Schmid, Albert Jongman, et al., studied working definitions of terrorism  
and published Political Terrorism: A New Guide to Actors, Authors, Concepts, Data Bases, 
Theories, and Literature, in which they identified 109 different definition suggested by 200 
different terrorism experts.  
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Likewise, Louise Richardson pointed that, “like pornography, we know 
terrorism when we see it”17. Diverging from these circular assertions, 
Richard Rubenstein in his part remarked "[a] definition of terrorism is 
hopeless [. . .][because] terrorism is just violence that you don't like."18 Still 
scholars like John Whitbeck stress on the subjectivity of defining terrorism 
in which he argues, "[p]erhaps the only honest and globally workable 
definition of terrorism is an explicitly subjective one - violence I don't 
support."19 We can continue referring to numerous definitions and 
arguments, the list is bottomless. But, the multitude of understanding and 
assertion only suggests the mayhem of defining terrorism we are all in.  
 Cognizant of the definitional impasse, the United Nations—as a 
multistate organ―urges and let states to domesticate terrorism and defined it 
in their domestic laws. That is why states mainly—and unusually—adapt 
their anti-terrorism laws from other states than adopting from international 
legal instruments.  
 Letting states to define terrorism based on their own understanding 
and reality is a two-edged sword solution. On the one edge, it resolve the 
definitional impasse that the international community stuck with for long, 
but still struggling to come up with an all agreed and all-inclusive definition, 
on the one hand, however, on the other edge, states full autonomy in defining 
this politically loaded act makes the act/concept prone to abuses. To 
paraphrase this contradictory implication, each state can define terrorism in 
its own term and motive but, that could result un(intended) consequences. 
 
‘Outsourcing Guantánamo’: an opportunity to Ethiopia 
 Late 2006, Ethiopia declares a preemptive ‘self-defense’ war against 
its neighbor Somalia. Triggered by a war propaganda disseminated by the 
Islamic Courts Union (IUC),a loose Union of Sharia Courts in Somalia that 
was established paralleling the Transitional Federal Government of 
Somalia20—outside of the capital Mogadishu. By the time, Ethiopia justifies 
its declaration as a measure taken as per Article 51 of the UN Charter, which 
allows defending itself from the war mongering jihadists in Mogadishu. The 
anticipatory ‘self-defense’ measure was fiercely criticized at home and 
                                                            
17 Louise Richardson (2007), What Terrorists Want: Understanding the Enemy, Containing 
the Threat 
18 Richard Rubenstein (1989) cited Supra 17.  
19 John V. Whitbeck (2001), ‘Terrorism’: The word itself is dangerous, The Daily Star 
20 Cedric Barnes and Harun Hassan , The Rise and Fall of Mogadishu’s Islamic Courts, 
Journal of Eastern African Studies, Vol. 1, No. 2 (2007), pp. 151-160. 
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abroad, nonetheless21. In spite of the resistance, Ethiopia went to Somalia, 
ousts IUC, but scored a little far-reaching effect.22 However, one thing the 
Somalia misadventure pronounces was that Ethiopia’s wish to fore stand and 
allied with the West’s Global War on Terror (hereinafter the GWT).  
 Following Ethiopia’s Somalia invasion23, a story of ‘terrorist’ 
rendition, which majorly involves Ethiopia—from different horn of African 
countries—broke out24. This new development later acknowledged Ethiopia 
and publicly announces the detention of forty-one individuals from 
seventeen different countries.25 Consequent to deploying soldiers in Somalia 
the rendition story was an addition and explicit indication of the Ethiopian 
government’s intention in riding on GWT bandwagon. Human Rights 
organizations—who followed this unprecedented phenomenon in the horn—
were critical of transporting individuals from another country to Ethiopia, 
which was/is known for its ill treatment of prisoners. Among many, John 
Sifton, Human Rights Watch expert on counterterrorism describes the 
rendition phenomenon as “decentralized, outsourced Guantanamo”26, in 
which Ethiopia, act as a site and host of the rendition. This early case of the 
Ethiopian states’ involvement in interrogating and prosecuting alleged 
terrorists, paves the way wide for it to using the criminal justice system as a 
counterterrorism tool27 
 Although, Ethiopia’s ‘action’ against Somalia—whether it is an 
invasion or self-defense—was a millstone on the fight against terrorism, 
however, prior to 2006, Ethiopia was expressing in many circumstances, its 
                                                            
21 At home, members of the then Ethiopian parliament were fiercely pronounced their 
objection to moving to Somalia and many International bodies were warning against the 
‘reckless’ and ‘exit-less’  intervention strategy.  
22 Christopher Daniels (2012), Somali Piracy and Terrorism in the Horn of Africa (A 
Scarecrow Press Series) 
23 Opponents of this move often used the term ‘invasion’, however the Ethiopian 
government prefers to call it a ‘preemptive self-defense’ taken as per Article 51 of the UN 
Charter, which mandated states to defend themselves from any kind of ‘clear and present 
danger’ that probably endanger the nations’ wellbeing.  
24 See, Salim Lone, Inside Africa's Guantánamo, The Guardian (April 27, 2007) Robert 
Walker, Investigating 'Africa's Guantanamo', The BBC (October 01, 2008) 
25 The New York Times, Ethiopia concedes it is holding 41 terror suspects, (April 10, 2007) 
26 US interrogating at Africa's secret prisons (April 07, 2007), NBC News, available at, 
http://www.nbcnews.com/id/17935971/ns/world_news-africa/t/ap-us-interrogating-africas-
secret-prisons/#.WMBlbG_yvcs 
27 Among some of prominent terrorism trials―prior to 2009―the trial of Bashir Makhtal, 
Ethiopian born Canadian is worth to be mentioned here.  Bashir was a businessman who was 
working in the horn of Africa. In one fateful day, in 2006, he found himself in crossfire and 
renditioned to Ethiopia by the Kenyan authorities, alleged of contacting with operatives 
within the Ogaden National Liberation Front (ONLF). As a result, he was convicted of 
terrorism and sentenced to life imprisonment. Despite the global condemnation and 
Canadian government’s call for his release, Bashir is still in Ethiopian prison.  
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keen interest and determination to join the global effort of quelling terrorism. 
Justifying that its interest, the government of Ethiopia oftentimes assert that 
prior to 9/11 Ethiopia was fighting terrorism ‘alone’ in different fronts.28 At 
this juncture, a bombing incident in Addis Ababa—on the first year 
anniversary of 9/11 attack, September 11, 2002, for example, is a case 
worthy mention. On September 11, 2002 evening a bomb blasted in a small 
hotel at the heart of Addis Ababa, the capital of Ethiopia.29 The Ethiopian 
government immediately blames the Oromo Liberation Front (hereinafter the 
OLF)—an old rebel group which fought against the previous military 
regimes in Ethiopia along with the incumbent, Ethiopian People 
Revolutionary Democratic Front (hereinafter the EPRDF)—as the 
perpetrator of the action and called the attack ‘a terrorist act’. However, the 
OLF later denounces the allegation in a damning statement, pointing to the 
motive behind as, "[o]ur [o]rganization considers terrorism in all its forms as 
an act of desperation […] the regime in Addis Ababa was desperately trying 
to jump on the anti-terrorism bandwagon to use it as a political ticket to stay 
in power, to deceive the international community and blackmail opposition 
forces"30. Since then, the September 11, 2002 incident becomes one of the 
state’s justifications in introducing an anti-terrorism law. 
 Summing up, headlines like ‘Ethiopia remains tough on terrorism’31, 
‘Ethiopia takes military action against multi-national terrorism groups’32, 
‘Suspected terrorists on trial in Ethiopia’33, and so forth, precedes 9/11 as 
well Ethiopia’s 2006 Somalia mishap. The post-9/11 world only galvanized 
the Ethiopian government’s effort in making terrorism at the center of its 
foreign and security policy. 
 Drifting from such major historical underpinnings, the model the 
state used to employ in the pre-2009 era was, ‘the war model’ of 
counterterrorism—a model that advocates for waging a full scale war on 
                                                            
28 Oftentimes, the Ethiopian government made an inflated account on the nature and the 
number of ‘terrorist attacks’ prior to 2009. The former Deputy Director of the Ethiopian 
National Intelligence Security Service, Woldeselassie Woldemichael in his book, Terrorism 
in Ethiopia and the Horn of Africa threat, impact and response (2010) claimed two hundred 
thirty eight ‘terrorist attacks’ from 1991 to 2009. Brihanu Adelo, one of the drafter of the 
antiterrorism law, on the other hand, claims a far less numbers of ‘terrorist attacks’, which 
he tallied only sixty five terrorist attacks’ in the same period of time.  
29 Nita Bhalla (02 October, 2002), Ethiopia links blast to Oromo rebels, available at 
http://news.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/africa/2293185.stm 
30 The Oromo Liberation Front (September 18, 2002), Press Statement. 
31 “Ethiopia remains tough on terrorism”, Ethiopia Observer, September, 1996, Volume 05, 
Issue 07.  
32Ibid. 
33 “Suspected terrorists on trial in Ethiopia”, Ethiopia Observer, April 1996, Volume 05, 
Issue, 03.  
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terrorists—and somehow ‘the intelligence model’—a model that advocates 
for surveilling terrorists and gathering intelligence reports on their 
activities34. These models were mainly targeting foreigners in foreign soil—
like the case of Somalia—and in a certain way proved to be effective. In the 
pre-2009 era of countering terrorism, notwithstanding that there were some 
attempts to brought terrorists to justice, the criminal justice model of counter 
terrorism was barley used. In the rare circumstances that terrorists were 
brought to justice, the regular criminal justice mechanism and the customary 
justice apparatuses were enforced35.  
 Generally, the changed global rhetoric on terrorism after the 9/11 
terrorist attack opened the door wide to Ethiopia to mount over the 
counterterrorism bandwagon, which eventually paves the way for adopting 
its own anti-terrorism  law, on July 2009—which as it later proved—
significantly impacted the political and legal sphere of the nation.  
 
The nuts and bolts of Proclamation No. 652/2009 
“Today is a historic day. All of us in this house—sitting left and 
right—should resist this law. If not, from this now onwards we are 
surrendering our country’s fate to be determined by dictators, thugs, 
and the police.”36 
 This was the prophetic warning by one of Ethiopia’s prominent 
parliamentarian, Bulcha Demeksa, moments before Ethiopia’s Anti-terrorism 
proclamation Number 652/2009 passed, on July 07, 2009. For Bulcha and 
many critics of the law, it curtails individuals’ substantive rights by widely 
defining terrorism and conflating dissent with terrorism; as well it erodes 
procedural constitutional rights by widening the power of the state security 
apparatus—the police, the intelligence and the prosecutor general.37 
 A detailed legal analysis of the ATP is beyond the scope of this paper 
and it is done elsewhere38. However, in a belief that shading a light on the 
background and the basic pillars of the law is essential to understand its 
                                                            
34 See Supra 29. 
35 See, for example, Safwat Hassan Abdel-Ghani et al v the Federal Public Prosecutor case 
(1995) and Muhamed Mahemmed Farahet al v the Federal Public Prosecutor case (1998), 
in which alleged terrorists attempted to assassinate the former president of Egypt, Hosni 
Mubarak and former Ethiopia’s UN representative, Dr. Abdul Mejid Hussien, respectively. 
In both cases the court convicts the alleged assassins as per the regular Penal Code and 
procedural rules.  
36 A translation of his Amharic speech in the parliament: “ይይ ይይይይ ይይ ይይይይ ይይይይ 
ይይይይ ይይይ ይይይ ይይ ይይይ ይይይይይይ ይይይ ይይይይ ይይ ይይይይ ይይይይይ 
ይይይይይይ ይይይይይይ ይይይይይይይይይ ይይይይ ይይይይይ ይይይይ ይይይይይይ ይይ” 
37 See Supra 6 
38 See Supra 8 
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application, the author will tries to discuss the basic tenets of the 
proclamation.   
 As tried to indicate above, Ethiopia’s move to enacting a separate law 
governing terrorism and related activities was an issue in the table before its 
actual adoption on July 2009. Since the year 2001, Ethiopia reached to 
different stakeholders in search of a model anti-terrorism law and discussed 
the importance of having one. However, in the 2002—detouring from its 
stand, Ethiopia was assuring the UN about the adequacy of the regular 
criminal justice materials and apparatus in countering terrorism39. Flipping 
from this expressed position, in the year 200440, 200641, and 200742, a bill on 
criminalizing terrorism and persecuting terrorists was tabled to the House of 
People’s Representative (hereinafter HPR). In all the time it was tabled, it 
failed to pass to the final stage of adoption for unclear reasons, nonetheless. 
In the meantime, being a member of the UN, Ethiopia adopts half of the UN 
legal instruments concerning terrorism and related activities43. Besides this 
various UN Security Council resolutions44 are also mandatorily applicable in 
Ethiopia.  
                                                            
39Abdulmejid Hussein (Ambassador), Ethiopia’s Permanent Representative to the UN 
(2002), Letter dated 7 November 2002 from the Chairman of the Security Council 
Committee established pursuant to resolution 1373 (2001) concerning counter-terrorism 
addressed to the President of the Security Council, November, 2002.  
40 US State Department, Country Reports on Terrorism Office Of The Coordinator For 
Counterterrorism (2005), available at,  https://www.state.gov/j/ct/rls/crt/45388.htm 
41 US State Department, Country Reports on Terrorism Office Of The Coordinator For 
Counterterrorism (2007), available at https://www.state.gov/j/ct/rls/crt/2006/82730.htm 
42 US State Department, Country Reports on Terrorism Office Of The Coordinator For 
Counterterrorism (2008), available at https://www.state.gov/j/ct/rls/crt/2007/103705.htm 
43 Since the first comprehensive convention on terrorism, the Convention on Offences and 
Certain Other Acts Committed On board Aircraft was adopted in 1963 until the time this 
paper was written, the UN proposed a total of nineteen Universal antiterrorism legal 
instruments for states to ratify. Ethiopia as a founding member of the UN is a signatory of 
nine of these instruments namely; Convention on Offences and Certain Other Acts 
Committed On Board Aircraft (Ratified on  March 27, 1979), Convention for the 
Suppression of Unlawful Acts against the Safety of Civil Aviation (Ratified on September 23, 
1971), Convention for the Suppression of Unlawful Seizure of Aircraft (Ratified on 
December 22, 1993), Protocol For The Suppression Of Unlawful Acts Of Violence At 
Airports Serving International Civil Aviation (Ratified on December 15, 1999), Convention 
on the Prevention and Punishment of Crimes against Internationally Protected Persons, 
including Diplomatic Agents (Ratified on April 16, 2003), International Convention against 
the Taking of Hostages (Ratifies on April 16, 2003), International Convention for the 
Suppression of Terrorist Bombings (Ratified on April 16, 2003), International Convention 
for the Suppression of the Financing of Terrorism (Ratified on March 20, 2012), and 
Convention for the Suppression of Unlawful Acts against the Safety of Maritime Navigation 
(Ratified on July 29, 2013).  
44 Among other resolutions see, U.N. Security Council, 3915th Meeting, Resolution 1189 
(1998) [Condemning International terrorism]. (S/RES/1189), U.N. Security Council, 4053rd 
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 Finally, after years of failed attempts, on January 2009, the 
government of Ethiopia circulates the draft of the anti-terrorism law among 
confidants, internally. The draft was leaked to International Human Rights 
Organizations and many of them expressed their concern over the over 
broadly designed law.45 By the time, officials were expressing their dismay 
over the leaked copy of the law and that was one of the definite reasons for 
many to be concerned—the fact that the state is trying to legislate a new law 
without the public’s participation in secret was an indicative of the motive 
behind the proposed law. Later, after an insignificant discussion in the state 
house, the draft was adopted as Proclamation on Anti-terrorism No. 
652/2009, with little insignificant changes.  
 Reading the preamble of the proclamation cumulatively with the 
expressed motives of the drafters during the pre-enactment discussions, told 
us, basically inter alia, there were three major reasons46 that necessitates the 
adoption of the anti-terrorism  law—the legal loophole on governing 
terrorism and related activities, executing Ethiopia’s international 
commitments to counterterrorism, and  enabling the existing security 
apparatus to counterterrorism. 
 Notwithstanding that a theoretical and legal analysis of the ATP is far 
afield of this work, but, a limited discussion on the major/controversial 
provisions of it will clear the cloud of misunderstanding on its applicability. 
The ATP mainly raises rabble on two core notions, an overbroad substantive 
conception of terrorism and an overblown executive power camouflaged as 
enabling legal procedures.  
 
                                                                                                                                                        
Meeting, Resolution 1269 (1999) [on the responsibility of the Security Council in the 
maintenance of international peace and security], (S/RES/1269) resolution, U.N. Security 
Council, 43705th Meeting, Resolution 1368 (2001) [Threats to international peace and 
security caused by terrorist acts]. (S/RES/1368), U.N. Security Council, 4385th Meeting, 
Resolution 1373 (2001) [Threats to international peace and security caused by terrorist 
acts], and U.N. Security Council, 5053rd Meeting, Resolution 1566 (2004) [Threats to 
international peace and security caused by terrorist acts]. (S/RES/1566) 
45 See Supra 6. 
46As one of the drafters of the antiterrorism law, Dr. Hashim Tewfik remarks the triggering 
factors that necessitates the law are “[a]bsence of a clear provision criminalizing acts of 
terrorism as such, inadequate penalties incompatible with the heinous nature of the crimes, 
failure to criminalize an act of bombing a place of public use, a state or government facility, 
a public transportation system or an infrastructure facility, failure to criminalize acts of 
threat to kill or injure a hostage in order to compel a third party to do or abstain from doing 
any act, failure to criminalize financing a terrorist act as a separate crime, failure to 
criminalize acts of nuclear terrorism and acts committed with the purpose of coercing a 
government or a group to abstain from having a particular stand point are among the serious 
limitations of the Criminal Code” Cited by Hiruye Wube, Some Points on the Ethiopian 
Anti-Terrorism Law from Human Rights Perspective (2012).  
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Contentious substance 
 Mindful of that the road to defining terrorism is tumultuous, the ATP 
avoids defining terrorism directly. Rather it defines ‘terrorist acts’ and 
terrorist organizations’ and declares anyone who has a smidgen of 
connection with the listed acts and proscribed organizations—as it will be 
discussed later—as a terrorist. Quoting directly from the law, ”[w]hosoever 
or a group intending to advance a political, religious or ideological cause by 
coercing the government, intimidating the public or section of the public, or 
destabilizing or destroying the fundamental political, constitutional or, 
economic or social institutions of the country [—] causes a person’s death or 
serious bodily injury; creates serious risk to the safety or health of the public 
or section of the public; commits kidnapping or hostage taking; causes 
serious damage to property;  causes damage to natural resource, 
environment, historical or cultural heritages; and endangers, seizes or puts 
under control, causes serious interference or disruption of any public 
service”47 is defined as a terrorist under the ATP. Moreover, any act of 
planning, preparation, conspiracy, incitement, and attempt of the 
aforementioned acts also is provided as a reason to incriminate 
individuals/organizations as a terrorist.48 
 The debate over the substance of the ATP starts from this derivative 
definition of terrorism as prescribed by it. Those who criticize the law 
oftentimes mentioned the overbroad and sweeping nature of the definition. 
One of the earliest critics of the law pointed that “[t]he […] Proclamation 
provides an extremely broad and ambiguous definition of terrorism that 
could be used to criminalize non-violent political dissent and various other 
activities that should not be deemed as terrorism.”49 This ‘overly broad 
definition’ criticism of the law was reiterated by different scholars and 
organizations alike.50 Nonetheless, the state always sailed the ship to the 
other direction. The state’s defense of this broadly written definition was 
chiefly calling a straw man, which is evasive from the substance of the 
criticism. By arguing as the law is a carbon copy from the USA PATRIOT51 
                                                            
47Article 3, A proclamation Anti-terrorism No. 652/2009 
48 Id Article 4 
49 Human Rights Watch, Analysis of Ethiopia’s Draft Anti-Terrorism Proclamation, March 
9, 2009, p. 3. 
50 See Wondwossen Demissie Kassa, The Scope of Definition of a Terrorist Act under 
Ethiopian Law: Appraisal of its Compatibility with Regional and International 
Counterterrorism Instruments (2014), Hiruye Wube, Some Points on the Ethiopian Anti-
Terrorism Law from Human Rights Perspective (2012) 
51Uniting and Strengthening America by Providing Appropriate Tools Required to Intercept 
and Obstruct Terrorism (USA PATRIOT Act) Act, H. R. 3162, 107th Cong. (2001) 
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act 2001—which was replaced by the USA FREEDOM52 act in 2015—the 
British Terrorism act 2000—which was amended at least four times53—the 
European Union Model anti-terrorism  law, and the Australian anti-terrorism  
Bills,54 the government justifies the enactment of the law as it is. However, 
beyond referencing other countries laws as a justification, the state is not—so 
far—come up with any plausible defense against its detractors who are well 
remarking the overly written definition, which makes the law prone for 
abuse.   
 Bouncing from this condemnation, the other major rebuke forwarded 
against the substantive essence of the law is its criminalization of the broadly 
listed acts like, rendering support to terrorism—knowingly or 
unknowingly55—publications that rendered support to groups designated as 
terrorists—knowingly or unknowingly56—individuals who knowingly and 
unknowingly omits to cooperation with the state in its effort of countering 
terrorism57, and other unqualified and vaguely provided acts. Furthermore, 
the ATP, without distinguishing domestic terrorism with International 
terrorism, provides rules of proscription and de-proscription of terrorist 
organizations in Ethiopia. This, as it later in this paper discussed in depth, 
wreaks havoc on the whole legal and political landscape in Ethiopia.   
 Additionally, the law stipulates overextended executive powers to the 
police58, the intelligence59 and the public prosecutor60 is also a further 
criticism on the substance of the ATP, which eventually, puts the 
proclamation at the center of controversy and made it political cause. 
 
Procedural hurdles  
 As the previous discussion indicates, one of pushing factors behind 
the enactment of the ATP was the need for enabling the state security 
apparatus to effectively investigate, prosecute, and counter terrorism.61 
Accordingly, the ATP, in a deviant of the regular criminal justice 
                                                            
52Uniting And Strengthening America By Fulfilling Rights And Ensuring Effective Discipline 
Over Monitoring Act (USA FREEDOM Act) Act, H. R. 114-23, 115th Cong. (2015) 
53 The UK Terrorism Act 2000 (c.11) was amended four times in 2005, 2006, 2008, and 
2015. 
54 Parliament and public discussions prior to—and after—the adoption of the antiterrorism 
law.  
55 Article 5, A proclamation Anti-terrorism No. 652/2009 
56Id, Article 6 
57Id Article 12 
58Id Article 13, 17, 19, 21, and 22 
59Id Article 14 
60Id Article 23 
61 Implied on the preamble of the antiterrorism law. 
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administration regulations,62 repealed the regular criminal procedural law63 
and provides new evidentiary and procedural rules that serve as a tool for 
investigation and prosecution of terrorism. These rules, as later 
developments proved, become the bone of contention between the state and 
its critics.  
 In this regard, the proclamation, inter alia, gives the state intelligence 
service the right to intercept and circumvent individuals’ conversation upon a 
court order64; the police—to conduct sudden65 and covert searches66 without 
court warrant, to arrest individuals without an arrest warrant67, and the right 
to detain individuals for an extended remand period68; the public 
prosecutor—to present unsubstantiated evidences69 that eventually shifts the 
burden of proof to the accused individual; and the court—to admit 
unsubstantiated hearsay and indirect evidences70, which makes the indicted 
individual’s ability to disprove allegations somehow impossible. 
 Critics amplifies these procedural provisions of the ATP as a major 
fault line in it that enables the State to compromise civil and political 
liberties in the name of countering terrorism.71 However, the government, 
oftentimes dismiss the critics accusing them as victims of double standard, 
which lacks a balance to compare the law with other countries anti-terrorism  
acts72―which is much aggressive in the states’ view—or as an essential 
extraordinary rules that extraordinary crimes like terrorism necessitates73. 
 Thus, the major factor that triggers this case study is the impasse 
between this two contending views over the ATP. On the one hand, there is a 
plethora of academic and non-academic critics that litigates for an 
amendment or total repeal of the law and on the other hand, there is a 
government tirelessly defends the law in any ways possible. Who was/is 
subject of the ATP? How it was implemented? And what does terrorism 
trials in Ethiopia proves? Are some of the major questions the following 
analysis on one hundred twenty three (N = 123) terrorism charges in 
                                                            
62 Ethiopian criminal Procedural code (1961), Proclamation No.185, Imperial Ethiopian 
Government 
63Ibid 
64Supra 55 Article 14 
65Id Article 16 
66Id Article 17 
67Id Article 19 
68Id Article 20 
69Id Article 23 
70Ibid 
71 See Supra 6.  
72 Sasahulh Yalew, A Comparative Review of Ethiopian and Western Anti-Terrorism 
Legislations (2010) 
73Ibid 
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Ethiopia—which constitutes nine hundred eighty five (N = 985) 
individuals—in sixty six months research period, attempts to answer. 
 
Methodology of the Study 
 This study blends an explanatory and exploratory approach of 
reaching to a problem. It tries to explain how Ethiopia’s anti-terrorism 
legislation was/is implemented and at the same time, it explores the rationale 
behind the specific application of the law in specific cases. Hence, aimed at 
understanding the outreach of the law, the author employed various methods 
of inquiry. Consequently, trial observations, interviews, and criminal charge 
analysis are the major research methods adopted in doing so.  
 Regardless of the enactment of Ethiopia’s anti-terrorism law on 
August 2009—as per the research data testifies—the first cases in reference 
of it were brought to court on September 201174—two years after the 
adoption of the law and three months after the Ethiopian parliament 
designates five organizations—three domestic and two international—as 
terrorist groups, as per Article 2/4 and 25 of the ATP. Hence the court cases 
studied in this research covers the time span of five years and six months—
stretched from September 2011 to March 2017.  
 Nonetheless, gathering the research data was the most daunting part 
of the research. Especially, gathering terrorism charges brought to court. 
This was because inter alia, three main reasons. 
 The first and the foremost one is the total absence of publicly 
accessible data. Although, the Federal Democratic Republic of Ethiopia 
(hereinafter FDRE) constitution clearly provided that unless otherwise 
provided that, trials are public and criminal charges must be easily available 
to the public75, it is almost impossible to get terrorism related criminal 
charges from the states’ archive. The lone public resource that could be 
consulted for the purpose of this research is the Ethiopian Year Book, 
published by the Federal Government Communication Affairs Office of 
Ethiopia—which is published annually for the past fourteen years. However, 
the year book barely mentioned data on terrorism and related trials. In fact, 
the 2013/1476 Year Book is the only one that mentioned the arrest of eighty 
                                                            
74 The first two terrorism related cases brought to court, citing the antiterrorism 
proclamations―on September 05, 2011―are the Elias Kifle et al v the Federal Public 
Prosecutor and Abdiweli Mohammed et al v the Federal Public Prosecutor. In both cases 
five Journalists are implicated.  
75 The cumulative reading of Article 19, 20, and 37 of the Federal Democratic Republic of 
Ethiopia’s Constitution 
76 The year 2013/2014 is Ethiopia’s 2006 as per the unique Ethiopian Calendar, which is 
neither Julian nor Gregorian. A year in Ethiopia has twelve even months each with thirty 
days and a thirtieth additional month with five days or six  on every leap year. 
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five individuals and who later brought to court alleged of terrorism and 
related activities. The rest of the Year Books mentioned actions taken by the 
police to counterterrorism in general terms that lacks specifics on the number 
of individuals arrested or/and the charge brought against them77.  
 The second challenge on the data gathering process was the 
enormousness of the cases and the gigantic number of individuals who are 
accused of terrorism, since September 2011. The lack of a centralized public 
archive along with the large amount of data makes the gathering 
cumbersome. Furthermore, while this research was developing new cases 
were brought to courts and that impacted the implication of the result of this 
study. Hence, the gathering requires a painstaking task designed to get the 
full picture of counterterrorism in Ethiopia.  
 To avoid a biased and half-baked result, the author employed a 
blanket-time based approach of data gathering. However, the lengthy 
research periods—five years and six months—was the third challenge the 
author find in employing an effective method of presenting the data. In this 
lengthy period, the state was jailing many individuals alleged of terrorism 
and the reasons given were numerous to decipher. Despite its advantage of 
reducing bias, the blanket approach has its own drawback. The foremost 
shortcoming was the regular update of new cases in which 2016 been a 
record year. Every time the state pressed a new terrorism charge against 
individuals that appears to affect/impact the result of the research. Hence, 
regular update and follow-up of the research data was challenging.  
 The data for this research was collected by directly accessing the 
criminal charges against individuals from the defendants themselves or/and 
from their representative and indirectly from reports that annotates terrorism 
charges brought by the Public Prosecutor in a reference to the ATP. By 
combining the directly accessed terrorism charges and the annotated reports 
along with in-person trial observations and refinement of the data, the author 
final tally stand on one hundred twenty three (N = 123) terrorism charges 
that lists nine hundred eighty five (N = 985) individuals/legal persons. 
Nonetheless, though this tally is the best that the author can collect, because 
of the aforementioned challenges, the author disclaim its exhaustiveness.   
 
Prosecution or Persecution: How the ATP was/is ab(used)? 
 The Ethiopian legal system is not new to treat cases related with 
terrorism. Prior to 2009—before terrorism charges used to be pressed against 
Ethiopians and foreign elements alike, in reference to the old imperial Penal 
Code later amended as the Criminal Code in 2004.  
                                                            
77 See for instance, Year Books for the year 2011/2012, 2012/2013 and 2014/2015.  
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 The repealed Imperial Penal Code of Ethiopia outlawed terrorism and 
terrorist methods in explicit terms78. The FDRE Criminal Code—which 
repealed and substitutes the Imperial Penal Code—copied the terms of the 
Penal Code and criminalizes acts of terrorism as criminal acts that would 
result rigorous punishments up to death79. As a result, prior to the adoption 
of ATP, the state used to press terrorism and related activities cases against 
individuals in numerous instances—referring to the two Criminal Codes80. 
That was one of the criticisms of the adoption of a distinct and separate anti-
terrorism law in Ethiopia. If the regular Criminal Code outlawed and 
criminalizes terrorism and if previous precedents demonstrate individuals’ 
conviction, why Ethiopia needs a separate anti-terrorism law? Was one of the 
points noted by detractors of the enactment of Proclamation 652/2009. 
Ironically, in contradiction to its later action—justifying the adoption of a 
distinct anti-terrorism law—the Ethiopian government, in its 2002 report to 
the UN affirms the critics’ position by indicating the adequacy of the 
Criminal Code to counter terrorism.81 
 This adequacy argument is somehow vindicated by recent court 
cases, in which we witnessed even after the enactment of the ATP that the 
state was/is sticking on the regular Criminal Code to incriminate individuals 
in some cases. The following three demonstrative cases would serve this fact 
better. The first of these cases is Tefera Mamo et al v the Federal Public 
Prosecutor case. On December 2009, five months after the adoption of the 
ATP, yet before the House of People Representative proscribe five 
groups/organizations as terrorist organizations, the state brought a case 
against military officials like Brigadier General Tefera Mamo and thirty six 
other individuals (some of them were accused in absentia). Although, the 
alleged charges brought against the accused fits the provisions of ATP―in 
its later applicability mode―the plaintiff refrained from using it and sticks 
with the Criminal Code, in which the defendants were alleged of a crime of 
outrage against the Constitution82. Bekele Gerba et al v the Federal Public 
Prosecutor is another case that validates the sates’ reliance to the Criminal 
Code provisions. Bekele Gerba, a prominent Ethiopian politician was 
arrested on August 2011, three months after the Ethiopian Parliament 
designates three domestic and two international groups as terrorist 
organizations. Although, Bekele Gerba and co were accused of working for 
                                                            
78  Article 270 and 282 of the Ethiopian Imperial Penal Code (1957), Proclamation No. No. 
158  
79 258 and 270 of the Criminal Code of  Federal Democratic Republic of Ethiopia Criminal, 
Proclamation 4014/2004 
80 See Supra 35 
81Supra 39 
82Supra 79, Article 238 
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the OLF—one of the terrorist designated groups—but, the state prefers to 
press a case against the defendants referring to the provision that 
criminalizes attack on the political and territorial integrity of the State under 
the Criminal Code. The same preference to the Criminal Code was 
demonstrated recently on the Dr. Merera Gudina et al v the Federal Public 
Prosecutor case. Despite the fact that the three defendants and two media 
organizations in the case are accused of leading/working with the two of the 
five designated terrorist organizations—the OLF and Ginbot 7—only the 
latter two media houses has been accused of abetting terrorism, the rest are 
indicted of outrage against the constitution as per the criminal code of 
Ethiopia.   
 Thus, as the aforementioned cases and many other similar cases 
testifies, even long after the enactment of the ATP, the state still relied—in 
some instances—on the Criminal Code, which only makes the application of 
the ATP more confusing and inconsistent. The lack of explanation and 
justifications for such inconsistent application from the state, furthermore, 
opens the door wide to for speculation of the use and abuse of the ATP.  
 In spite of the state’s reliance to the Criminal Code nonetheless, since 
September 2011, the dominant legal prosecution/political persecution in 
Ethiopia directly involves the anti-terrorism law.  
 
The data finding 
 On September 05, 2011, the Federal Public Prosecutor brought two 
terrorism related charges in reference to the anti-terrorism law. The first case 
involves five defendants (journalists) under Elias Kifle et al v the Federal 
Public Prosecutor—in which the defendants were accused of communication 
with members of Ginbot 7 Movement for Unity, Democracy and Justice. The 
second case brought to the Federal High court on the same days was the 
Abdiweli Mohamed et al v The Federal Public Prosecutor case—in which 
the defendants were accused of being a member of the ONLF and abetting its 
terrorist activities.  The latter case involves two Swedish Journalists who 
enters to Ethiopia to report83 on the humanitarian crisis in the restive 
Ethiopian Somali Region84.  
 The two cases that involved nine individuals were the first publicly 
reported and known cases brought to court as per the ATP. Out of the nine 
defendants, five of them were journalists. The fact that the law starts to be 
                                                            
83 Martin Schibbye and Johan Persson, 438 Days, (2013) 
84 Somali Regional State is one of the nine regions established by the FDRE Constitution in 
1995. According to the Human Right Watch the Ethiopian government is committing “war 
crime” and “crimes against humanity” in the area. See Human Rights Watch, Collective 
Punishment War Crimes and Crimes against Humanity in the Ogaden area of Ethiopia's 
Somali Regional State The region (2008) 
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implemented by accusing journalists was somehow considered as a 
vindication for the many critics of it.85 Contrarily, the state often fires back 
to such allegations by denigrating the criticisms to ideological squabbles86. 
 Since the first cases of terrorism—referring the ATP—brought to 
court on September 2011, its effect snowballed and every year set a new 
record number of defendants. According to the finding of this research in the 
past sixty six months—from September 2011 to March 2017—the Ethiopian 
government files one hundred twenty three (N = 123) separate terrorism 
charges referring, exclusively to the anti-terrorism  law, in which nine 
hundred eighty five (N = 985) defendants are implicated. Out of these cases 
fourteen (n = 14) of them are filed against lone individuals who were/are 
accused of being member and/or rendering support to 
designated/undesignated terrorist groups87. The rest one hundred nine (n = 
109) cases constitute two or more individuals with the highest listed seventy 
seven individuals in a single charge88. 
 
                                                            
85 In the first of the two cases, brought on September 05, 2011, Elias Kifle et al vs the 
Federal public Prosecutor, three of the five defendants are Journalist. Similarly in the 
second terrorism case filed in the same day, Abdiweli Mohammad et al v the Federal public 
Prosecutor, two of the four defendants are Journalists.  
86 See Supra 72 
87  The fourteen cases are Ahmed Mustafa v The Federal Public Prosecutor, Amanuel Desta 
v The Federal Public Prosecutor, Anteneh Tadesse v The Federal Public Prosecutor, 
Befekadu Abebe v The Federal Public Prosecutor, Bachu Merega v The Federal Public 
Prosecutor, Demeke Zewde v The Federal Public Prosecutor, Fasika Getachew v The 
Federal Public Prosecutor, Getachew Shiferawv The Federal Public Prosecutor, Hassen 
Dawud v The Federal Public Prosecutor, Ligabaw Girmaw v The Federal Public 
Prosecutor, Mamuye Diro v The Federal Public Prosecutor, Mohammad Abdulkadir v The 
Federal Public Prosecutor, Tesfaye Kiros v Tigray Regional State Public Prosecutor, and 
Yonatan Tesfaye v The Federal Public Prosecutor 
88 In the Miftah Shiek Surur et al v the Federal Public Prosecutor case, the state pressed a 
terrorism charge against seventy seven Prisoners of War in a single file.   
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The total studied cases categorized in different variables 
 (From September 2011 to March 2017) 
*By cases, the researcher is referring those criminal cases filed to the Federal High 
Court of Ethiopia―and in two different circumstances to the Amhara Regional State 
Supreme Court and the Tigray Regional State Supreme Court―as per the jurisdiction vested 
by the anti-terrorism Proclamation. 
 ** The number of defendants is an aggregate of the total of individuals who are 
accused of terrorism as per the anti-terrorism Proclamation in the research period. 
 *** These organizations are groups, which are proscribed as ‘terrorist 
organizations’ by the House of Peoples Representative on June 2011 and other groups which 
are not essentially designated by the house, but implicated as terrorist organizations on the 
studied court cases. 
 
Legal personality wise, the ATP under Article 2/17 provided that 
‘person’ refers to either physical or juridical person. Hence, out of the total 
research population (N = 985) accused of terrorism in the research period, 
four (n = 4) of them are juridical persons89 and the rest nine hundred eighty 
one indictees are physical persons. On the other hand, out of the total 
research population (N = 985), the state pressed terrorism charges against 
forty one (n = 41) individuals in absentia—in which the defendants are 
neither not in Ethiopia nor their specific address was identified on the 
charges. The rest nine hundred forty four (n = 944) defendants were charged 
after their actual arrest or freeze of their operation in case of the juridical 
persons.  
 When we see the citizenship of the defendants, the charges testified 
that thirty one (n = 31) individuals who were accused of terrorism since 
September 2011 are not Ethiopians90 and two juridical persons (n = 2) 
accused of rendering support for terrorism are US based Media Houses91. 
                                                            
89 In Abubaker Ahmad et al v the Federal Public Prosecutor case the prosecutor accuses 
Albir Development and Neme’ae NGO as organizations abetting terrorism and similarly in 
the Ethiopian Satellite Television and Oromia Media Network v The Federal Public 
Prosecutor case the state pressed similar charges against two US based juridical persons, the 
Ethiopian Satellite Television and Oromia Media Network.  
90 Those non-Ethiopians the research found in the list includes two Kenyans, one American, 
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The rest nine hundred fifty two (n = 952) defendants are either Ethiopian 
nationals or juridical persons legally registered in Ethiopia. This constitutes 
more than ninety six percent of the total number of the research population. 
Accordingly, the finding suggests the ATP was/is targets ninety six 
Ethiopians for every one hundred terrorism indictees.  
 Gender wise, more than ninety eight percent of the defendants are 
male—in which the research finds eighteen female defendants (n = 18) 
compared with nine hundred sixty seven male counterparts (n = 967). On the 
other hand, in all the one hundred twenty three cases (N = 123), fifteen92 
different—ideologically and operationally—groups (N = 15) are explicitly 
named as terrorist groups by the state, including the five (n = 5) officially 
proscribed groups on June 2011. 
 Saying this as a general remark—for further information on the 
studied cases see Appendix 1—on the finding, the next step was categorizing 
the data in certain frames and variables, hence it makes the inquiry 
understandable. The following topics will try to delve with these specifics. 
 
Proscription enables prosecution/persecution  
 The proclamation under article 25 empowered the House of Peoples 
Representative to proscribe any organization that commits acts of terrorism; 
prepares to commit acts of terrorism; supports or encourages terrorism; or is 
otherwise involved in any terrorism activities as a ‘terrorist organization’. 
The demonstrated understanding of this power of proscription is, the 
executive organ—the government—will submit its own list to the house and 
the house will approve/dismiss it. Practically, in the whole research period—
for that matter since the adoption of the law in 2009—the parliament 
convened only once for designation purpose―on June 2011―and proscribed 
five groups as ‘terrorist organizations’. These groups are Ginbot 7 for 
Justice, Freedom and Democracy, Ogaden National Liberation Front 
(ONLF), Oromo Liberation Front (OLF), Al-Qaeda, and Al-Shabaab. 
Whereas the former three are disgruntled Ethiopian rebel groups battling for 
the ouster of the regime in power, the latter two are a UN designated 
International terrorist groups93. This blanket approach—discussed in 
                                                            
92 These organizations/groups are Al-Qaeda, Al-Shabaab, Amhara Democratic Union Front, 
Benishangul People Liberation Movement, Ethiopian People Patriotic Front, Ferketul 
Linajiya Muslim Juma, Gambela Democratic Movement, Gambela People Liberation 
Movement, Ginbot 7 for Justice, Freedom and Democracy, Islamic State in Iraq and Syria, 
Jum'atitu Muslim Jihadi, Khawarij, Ogaden National Liberation Front, Oromo Liberation 
Front, and Tigray People Democratic Movement.  
93 Although the UN has no formal list of designated terrorist groups, in 1999, the UNSC 
listed the Al Qaeda group as a terrorist organization as per resolution 1267 and similarly, the 
Al Shabaab terrorist group was also listed by the UN as a terrorist group since 12 April, 
2010 as per UNSC resolution 1844, 2008. 
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subsequent topics in detail—was subjected to many criticisms94 however. 
Apparently, the ATP began to be implemented days after the parliament 
designates the aforementioned five organizations as terrorist organizations, 
on June 2016.  
 Out of the total—one hundred twenty three (N = 123)—cases studied, 
one hundred of the cases (n = 100) directly involves one of the five 
designated ‘terrorist organizations’. This represents more than eighty one 
percent of the total terrorism charges pressed by the state. On the other hand, 
ninety four (n_i = 94) of the one hundred (n = 100) cases are pressed against 
the three Ethiopian rebel groups—Ginbot 7, OLF, and ONLF—which is 
more than ninety three percent of the all the terrorism charges pressed 
against the designated groups.  
 In some cases the prosecutor mingled two or more designated 
groups—which are ideologically and tactically competing and different—in 
a single charge. For example, in the Masresha Sete et al v the Federal Public 
Prosecutor case, the state filed a case against thirty eight remand prisoners 
accusing them as members of three different designated groups namely, 
OLF, Ginbot 7, and Al Shabaab, simultaneously. In the Soliana Shimeles et 
al v the Federal Public Prosecutor case the state present a case against ten 
bloggers and journalists mentioning they have connection with two different 
proscribed terrorist groups, Ginbot 7 and OLF, concurrently. In the 
Ethiopian Satellite Television and Oromia Media Network v The Federal 
Public Prosecutor case the prosecutor general present a case against two 
Media Houses, Ethiopian Satellite Television and Oromia Media Network 
accusing them of rendering terrorist activities by Ginbot 7 and OLF, 
respectively. This messy and concurrent accusation of different individuals 
as linked with organizations exist within a different ideological and tactical 
realm appeared to be a very challenging thought task to comprehend.    
 Further, as the research finding indicates, the fact that eighty one 
percent of the total terrorism criminal charges filed in reference to the anti-
terrorism  law directly referred to the proscription clause provided by of the 
law, which later was executed by the federal chamber by proscribing five 
groups as terrorist organizations, with no further qualification. This eases the 
task of the public prosecutor immensely and shifts the burden of clearing self 
from the accusations to incarcerated individuals.  
 In this regard, in the Andualem Aragie et al v the Federal Public 
Prosecutor case, the state filed a single terrorism case against twenty four 
activists, politicians and journalist—in which the plaintiff failed to show a 
                                                            
94 See Asmelash Yohannes Teklu (PhD), Enhancing Human Rights Protection and National 
Security by Proscribing a ‘Terrorist’ Organisation: the Ethiopian Dilemma, Mekelle 
University Law Journal, Volume 4, June 2016. 
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modicum of evidence about how all the defendants could be accomplices—
merely by mentioning Ginbot 7, one of the designated groups—as a glue. 
Yet again, in the Gurmesa Ayano et al v the Federal Public Prosecutor case, 
a terrorism criminal charge was filed against twenty three individuals, in 
which some of them are vocal critics of foco and insurrection95—by a mere 
mention of OLF, one of the proscribed ‘terrorist groups’—as a common 
denominator. Similarly, in the case Abdiweli Mohammad et al v the Federal 
Public Prosecutor, the state instituted a terrorism charge by merely referring 
to one of the five proscribed terrorism groups—ONLF—and filed a case 
against four individuals, in which two of them happened to be foreigners, 
who are by any measure could not be part of the rebel group which is 
rebelling for the right of the Ogaden clan in Ethiopia. Hence, the sweeping 
designation rule enshrined under the ATP followed by the parliamentary 
measure to proscribe certain Ethiopian disgruntled rebel groups along with 
International terrorist groups proved to be the main tool that enables the state 
to crackdown dissidents and opposing voices alike.  
 The research finding, more over shows that in more than seventy 
percent of the cases—six hundred ninety nine persons ( n = 699)—in the 
research period, are individuals who are indicted of being members and 
rendering support to either the Ginbot 7 or the OLF rebel groups. 
Consequently, the (mis)application of the anti-terrorism law in reference to 
the proscription clause is more glaring on cases that involve members of the 
legally registered political parties and journalists accused of far-fetched 
connection with these two groups. (The author further discussed this issue in 
the subsequent topics).  
 Still looking deep to the cases, we found that forty five percent of all 
the cases are brought against individuals who are accused of leading and 
abetting the Ginbot 7 designated group. In this regard, in many of the cases 
the state alleges individuals who are members of legally registered political 
parties as perpetrators. For example, in the Getachew Mekonnen et al v the 
Federal Public Prosecutor case, the state filed a terrorism charge against 
sixteen individuals who are members of the legally registered All Ethiopians 
Unity Party (hereinafter AEUP), Blue Party, and Unity of Democracy and 
Justice Party (UDJ)―by conflating Ginbot 7, a proscribed group and the 
Amhara Democratic Unity Movement, an undesignated, but later labeled as a 
terrorist group by a court—as groups linked with the aforementioned legally 
registered political parties. Similarly, in the Zemene Miheret et al v The 
Federal Public Prosecutor file, the state takes the same approach of indicting 
leaders of AEUP as terrorists linked with Ginbot 7 designated group.  In 
                                                            
95 Notably, the fourth defendant of the case, Bekele Gerba was known for his hard belief on 
nonviolent struggle and oftentimes denouncing violence of any kind. 
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other instance, in Elias Kifle et al v The Federal Public Prosecutor case, in 
which the state pressed a charge against five individuals—three of them are 
journalists—associating them with the same group, Ginbot 7.  
 
Rating the five organizations—based on their political Manifestos—which 
are designated by the Ethiopian House of Peoples Representative, on June, 
2011 as ‘terrorist organizations’ through “The Seven Part Definitions” of 
terrorism as framed by Louise Richardson* 
 
*What Terrorists Want: Understanding the Enemy, Containing the Threat, 
November 13, 2007 
 
Likewise, twenty eight percent of all the cases were pressed against 
individuals who are accused of leading and abetting the OLF designated 
group. Nevertheless, as like as those cases brought against Ginbot 7, in many 
of the cases that involve OLF, the state conflates legally registered political 
parties with the proscribed groups. For example, in the  Gurmessa Ayano et 
al v The Federal Public Prosecutor case, the prosecutor pressed a terrorism 
charge against twenty two members of the Oromo Federalist Congress—a 
legally registered political party—alleging them of membership to the OLF 
by merely citing the proscription clause under the ATP. Similarly, in the 
Desta Dinqa et al v The Federal Public Prosecutor case the prosecutor 
followed a same approach of conflation. Furthermore, In the Yonatan 
Tesfaye et al v The Federal Public Prosecutor case, a terrorism charge that 
begs a rendering support for the OLF was instituted against Yonatan 
Tesfaye, a member of Blue party—a legally registered political party—citing 
the ATP’s designation clause.  
 In a stark contrast, in the research period, the state pressed a terrorism 
charge against two of the designated terrorist groups—Al Qaeda and Al 
Shabaab—only in less five percent of the total cases, in which the state 





























Al Qaeda               
Al 
Shabaab 
              
OLF       X X X X 
ONLF       X X X X 
Ginbot 7       X X X X 
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cases the absolute majority of the defendants are Ethiopians—accusing them 
of having connection with the Al Shabaab terrorist group in Somalia. For 
instance, In the Jafar Mohamed et al v the Federal Public Prosecutor case, 
seven Ethiopian defendants are accused of attempting to join the Shabaab 
terrorist groups. Similarly, In the Hassen Jarso et al v the Federal Public 
Prosecutor case, the prosecutor brought a terrorism charge against eleven 
individuals—ten of them are Ethiopians—for being members of the same 
terrorist group citing the proscription clause.   
 To sum up, of the total studied cases in the research period, more 
than eighty one percent of the cases assert their legitimate ground against the 
defendants referring to the proscription clause under Article 25 of the ATP. 
This proved the pivotal role the June 2011 designation of five groups as 
terrorist organizations played on. On the other hand, out of the total cases 
brought against the proscribed groups, ninety five percent of the cases are 
brought against Ethiopian power contending rebel groups designated as 
‘terrorist organizations’ and out of the total defendants included in this 
research more than ninety eight percent of the accused are Ethiopian 
nationals. Contrastingly, the finding suggests, unlike other countries and the 
global trend—of targeting foreigners by anti-terrorism laws—Ethiopia’s 
ATP mainly targets Ethiopian organizations and Ethiopian nationals, in 
which Foreign Terrorist Organizations and international terrorists are barley 
indicted of and seldom implicated. Hence, the proscription clause which was 
take in to force in a sweeping and targeting Ethiopians fashion vindicates the 
critics of the law from its very inception and it opens the door wide for 
political persecution.  
 
‘Terrorists’ beyond proscription  
 Notwithstanding that the major terrorism court cases are brought 
against the two proscribed groups, as the previous discussion indicates, 
however, among other things, one of the other major finding of the research 
on the application of the anti-terrorism law is its implementation against 
groups that are not designated as terrorist organizations by the federal 
chamber. During the research period, the state brought numerous terrorism 
cases against individuals mentioning ten undesignated groups; the Amhara 
Democratic Union Front, Benishangul People Liberation Movement, 
Ethiopian People Patriotic Front, Ferketul Linajiya Muslim Juma, Gambela 
Democratic Movement, Gambela People Liberation Movement, Islamic 
State in Iraq and Syria, Jum'atitu Muslim Jihadi, Khawarij, and Tigray 
People Democratic Movement.  
 Article 2/4 of the ATP defined a “terrorist organization” as a group, 
association or organization which is composed of not less than two members 
with the objective of committing acts of terrorism or plans, prepares, 
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executes or cause the execution of acts of terrorism or assists or incites 
others in any way to commit acts of terrorism; or an organization so 
proscribed as terrorist by the parliament pursuant to Article 25 of it. Hence, 
the law prescribes a wide and open definition of terrorist organizations—as 
any group who aimed to commit the widely listed terrorist acts under Article 
3 of the proclamation or any group designated as a terrorist group by the 
Federal parliament.  
 The research finds that about twenty percent—twenty three cases (n 
= 23)—of the total terrorism related—one hundred twenty three (N = 123)—
charges brought against individuals, in reference to the ATP are cases 
mentioning undesignated groups, which are considered as terrorist 
organizations by the plaintiff as per Article 2/4/a of the ATP. Among these 
ten groups nine of them are Ethiopian groups, which testify the fact that still 
the application of the ATP over undesignated groups is mainly focused on 
Ethiopian nationals.  
 Regarding the indictment of individuals alleged of abetting the work 
of undesignated terrorist groups, in the Abubakar Ahmed et al v the Federal 
Public Prosecutor case for example, a terrorism case was brought against 
twenty nine Ethiopian religious activists, leaders and journalists and two 
religious organizations, in which the state labeled a peaceful religious right 
protest movement96, Dimitsachin Yisema as a terrorist organization and 
allege the defendants as the leaders of it. Similarly, in the Piliman Kuwot et 
al v the Federal Public Prosecutor case, the prosecutor pressed a terrorism 
case against ten parliamentarians and state officials associating them with a 
disgruntled rebel group—Gambela People Liberation Movement—which is 
labeled by the executive (not the parliament) as a terrorist group. Likewise, 
in the Abdulkerim Abdusemed v the Federal Public Prosecutor case, seven 
individuals are accused of being members of another disgruntled rebel 
group—the Benishangul People Liberation Movement—even though 
undesignated by the parliament, but the prosecutor labeled it as a terrorist 
organization pursuant to Article 2/4/a of the ATP.  
 Thus from the studied cases we can conclude that, the very 
application of the ATP in one out of every five cases targets groups which 
are not proscribed as terrorist organizations by the parliament and in all the 




                                                            
96 See, Human Rights Watch, Ethiopia: Prominent Muslims Detained in Crackdown, 
available at https://www.hrw.org/news/2012/08/15/ethiopia-prominent-muslims-detained-
crackdown , (August 2012)  
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One-sized law—one-sized application 
 Out of the many criticisms of the Ethiopian anti-terrorism law, its 
widely written drafting and the blanket conflating approach it followed are 
the principal ones. The law failed to make specific treatment to Foreign 
Terrorist Organizations (hereinafter FTOs), international terrorism, domestic 
terrorism, and home grown extremism is one of the most vocal disapproval 
against it. Hence, one of the studied topics on the application of the ATP in 
this research was the question of how the law treated these different, but 
related notions of terrorism and related activities. 
 For the purpose of this research FTOs are defined as groups/powers 
based abroad—not in Ethiopia—but working to hamper Ethiopia’s interest 
using a terroristic tactic; International terrorists are groups/powers located 
inside Ethiopia, but inspired by and take direction from a FTOs or foreign 
power/s; Homegrown violent extremists are on the other hand, those who are 
inspired by, but do not take direction from, FTOs; and Domestic terrorists 
are those who are not inspired by, and do not take direction from, a foreign 
terrorist organization or foreign power and working against Ethiopia’s 
interests employing terroristic tactics.97 By ‘terroristic activity’, the author is 
referring to those acts, which fulfilled the three main elements of terrorism; 
essentially violent, aimed at a certain ideological end, and targeting civilians. 
 The ATP failed to identify these different kinds of groups, by rather 
taking a very general approach of defining every group in a single term. 
When we see the application, beyond the main targets of the ATP—rebel 
groups, activists, and writers—we get cases the ATP was/is used against 
each of the aforementioned four groups. For instance, in the Aman Assefa et 
al v the Federal Public Prosecutor case, a terrorism charge was pressed 
against twenty seven individuals in which some of the leaders are trained 
abroad—in Somalia—by a FTO—Al Shabaab—and attempted to commit a 
terrorist act in Ethiopia and against Ethiopia’s interest abroad. Likewise, in 
the Abdulwahid Abdela et al v the Federal Public Prosecutor case, the state 
accuses twenty individuals as groups inspired by the international terrorist 
group named Islamic State in Iraq and Syria otherwise known as ISIS and 
conspires to commit a terrorist act in Ethiopia. Contrastingly, in cases like 
Bederu Ababor et al v the Federal public Prosecutor, the plaintiff pressed a 
terrorism charge against nine individuals accusing them for domestic 
terrorism. Furthermore, in the Mohammad Abdulkadir v Federal public 
Prosecutor case, the state charges a lone individual with terrorism alleged of 
proselyting a violent homegrown extremism. One thing that makes the 
                                                            
97 For more detailed discussion on this categorization, see, Susan Hennessey, The Good 
Reasons to Not Charge All Terrorists With Terrorism, available at 
https://www.lawfareblog.com/good-reasons-not-charge-all-terrorists-terrorism, (2015) 
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aforementioned four instances common is that the state uses the same 
provisions of the ATP by conflating the different features and motive of each 
different cases and associated group, which eventually eases the state’s 
burden to prove the cases against defendants.  
 This prosecutorial policy of melting every kind of political 
violence/activity in the same pot of terrorism boarders’ persecution than 
prosecution and endangers civil and political liberties enshrined under the 
FDRE constitution. The ATP amplified and implied a single understanding 
of each of aforementioned groups and the application of it takes a similar 
approach as it was demonstrated in many similar cases. This raises a 
question over the effectiveness of the law to countering terrorism by 
uprooting ‘real terrorists’ from the breeding ground. 
 
High vulnerability of dissidents 
 The other aspect of the research finding suggests a certain visible 
pattern on the identity of group of ‘victims’ people who are indicted as per 
the anti-terrorism law. The Proclamation’s over broad and sweeping 
provisions executed by an approach that enables the state to lodge a terrorism 
case against possibly any one dissenting makes some group of people more 
prone to be labeled as terrorists and ultimately convicted of it.  
 As it tried to indicate in the above topics, the ATP was mainly—in 
more than seventy percent of the total cases and in more than seventy percent 
of the defendants—used against two major dissident groups—Ginbot 7 and 
the OLF—who rebelled against the state. However, in one third of the cases, 
the state accuses writers, rights activists, and members of legally registered 
political parties citing the ATP and associating them—though in many of the 
cases the defendants decried against the tactics employed by the two groups 
who aspire to overthrow the EPRDF led regime in Ethiopia—mainly with 
the two rebel groups. This again is a problem directly related with the 
sweeping proscription rule discussed above. Proscribing political insurgent 
groups aspired to oust the regime in power along with Foreign Terrorist 
Organizations opens the door wide to devour dissidents of all sort—by 
making them part of those designated groups.  
 Hence, the proclamations seldom application (only less than five 
percent of the cases) against FTOs and international terrorist, on the one 
hand and its inflated overstretch to political activists and writers in a very 
visible and clear fashion calls for inquiring the motivating factor behind its 
enactment and raise doubt on the necessity of it to tackle terrorism. 
Ultimately, this fact begs us to ask, is this law designed to prosecute 
terrorists or to persecute dissent?  
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Janus-faced law: but why? 
 Leaving the academic arduous and unresolved discourse over the 
meaning of terrorism, it is widely agreed that the menace of terrorism is 
universal and a threat to every nation. Ethiopia as a sovereign nation has all 
the right to securitize its citizens and to fight terrorism tooth and claw. 
Furthermore, classifying terrorism as a sui generis and treating in that sort 
distinctly is all essential and sanely understandable. However, as far as the 
extent of the threat of terrorism to the national interest of Ethiopia, there is a 
big discrepancy among scholars and commentator.  
 Although, the Ethiopian government justifies the adoption of a 
counterterrorism law and establishment of a national anti-terrorism  team 
citing ‘hundreds of terrorist attacks’ in the past two decades98, many doubts 
this claim as a politically inflated assertion. To the vindication of the later, in 
some instances, the Ethiopian government was implicated in fake terrorist 
plots to justify its sweeping counterterrorism strategy.99 Nonetheless, in spite 
of such criticism, some scholars praised the way the Ethiopian government 
deals with terrorism by employing para-military strategies100.  
 For commentators and writers like David Shinn, the current strategy 
has a mixed feeling in which he remarked that, “Ethiopia has every right to 
respond harshly to acts that are clearly terrorist[ic] in nature.  Most countries 
would do the same thing […] Ethiopia has the right to stop terrorist groups 
such as al-Shabaab from conducting acts inside Ethiopia.  It has generally 
been successful at preventing terrorist attacks by non-Ethiopian groups 
reside […] outside the country.” However, he retorted that “[t]he problem is 
applying the definition of terrorism to acts where it just does not apply.  
More importantly, I would like to see Ethiopia make a much greater effort to 
respond to root causes of terrorism such as emphasizing the rule of law, 
permitting a relatively free press, and allowing greater scope to express 
dissent peacefully.  Economic development is also important, especially 
when it benefits all elements of society.”101 
 Contrastingly, Dr. Yakob Hailemariam, a leading lawyer and 
politician expressed his deep concern about the very need the law, the harsh 
implementation of the ATP, and the whole counterterrorism strategy the 
                                                            
98 See Supra 28 vis-à-vis Global Terrorism Database 43 years report available at 
https://www.start.umd.edu/gtd/search/Results.aspx?search=Ethiopia&sa.x=31&sa.y=17&sa
=Search 
99 Thomas C. Mountain, Ethiopia Bombs Itself, Blames Eritrea available at 
https://www.foreignpolicyjournal.com/2011/09/16/wikileaks-ethiopia-files-ethiopia-bombs-
itself-blames-eritrea/, (2011) 
100 Mehari Taddele Maru, The secret to Ethiopia's counterterrorism success, available at, 
http://www.aljazeera.com/indepth/opinion/2015/07/secret-ethiopia-counterterrorism-
success-150728112317438.html 
101 The author’s Interview with Ambassador David Shinn (December 2016) 
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Ethiopian government is currently implementing. Yakob argues that, “based 
on empirical and practical evidences the extent of terrorism threat to Ethiopia 
is an exaggerated thing, which can be quelled using the regular criminal laws 
as it used to be.”102 Furthermore he adds the current approach of countering 
terrorism in Ethiopia as a very flawed approach that misses its targets and 
collaterally victimizes dissidents.  
 The ATP was adopted in the middle of such debates from both sides. 
Up on its implementation it proved that it mainly targeting Ethiopian 
dissident groups—in large majority of the cases—and only used to prosecute 
individuals accused of abetting and conspiring for Foreign Terrorist 
Organizations (FTOs) in less than five percent of the total cases.  Although 
some of the cases against FTOs can be corroborated by ample evidences103, 
in some other cases, there is still a cloud of clarity on the cases pressed 
against some individuals implicated in association with the FTOs104.  
 Hence, the sweeping implementation of the widely spelled Ethiopian 
anti-terrorism  law which was justified as a tool designed to make the 
security apparatus effective in countering terrorism inflicts a problem on the 
whole political and legal landscape. This begs us to examine the two 
contradictory Janus-faced features of the ATP going through major 
takeaways of its implementations. 
 The first takeaway from the implementation of the ATP is a sense of 
weaponized law—laws that targets and struck those individuals and organs 
that are not abided with political willingness of those in power. Based on the 
data in the research, the most sensible takeaway is the persistent trend of 
targeting disgruntled political groups and dissidents of every kind by 
extension. This led us to the conclusion that the ATP—unlike what it 
promised to do—is highly abused in a manner of targeting specific political 
groups and ideas who has nothing to do with the essential understanding of 
terrorism or violence for that matter.  
 In this regard the ATP is serving the state as one of those lois 
scélérates, which are enacted in the past decade in Ethiopia105. The main 
similar features of these laws are their targets. Most of these laws are 
                                                            
102 The author’s Interview with Dr. Yakob Hailemariam (January 2017) 
103 The authors prison conversation with Hassan Jarso Kotola, a Kenyan national and a  
member of Al-Shabaab terrorist group, who is sentenced for 17 years of rigorous 
imprisonment in Ethiopia (May 2014) 
104 The author’s prison conversation with Anus Mohammad, a Somali national who is 
sentenced for 9 years of rigorous imprisonment in Ethiopia (2015) 
105 Among these laws, the Freedom of the Mass Media and Access to Information 
Proclamation No. 590/2008 Charities and Societies Proclamation No. 621/2008, the 
Antiterrorism Proclamation 652/2009, and A Proclamation to provide for the Electoral Code 
of Conduct for Political Parties No. 662/2009 are the most notable ones. 
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targeting political opponents and writers of all sorts for politically motivated 
reasons. The anti-terrorism law plays a leading role in this effort.  
 The other takeaway from the application of the ATP is its execution, 
which mainly motivated to delegitimize dissent of every kind. In the large 
majority of the cases, individuals are indicted of terrorism for trivial or no 
reasons. The general and vague terms of the law followed by its sweeping 
application, makes it easy for the state to use terrorism as a deligitimization 
tool against dissidents. Given the fact that terrorism is a universal pejorative 
term—once political operatives, activists, and writers are labeled as 
‘terrorists’ by the law, it is tough for them to clean their tarnished good will 
and eventually they will lose legitimacy among their constituency or/and 
from the international community.  
 The third intended result from the sweeping implementation of the 
Ethiopian anti-terrorism law is the state’s aspiration to gain legitimacy in the 
name of countering terrorism. By prosecuting as many individuals as 
possible as terrorists, the Ethiopian government implies it is fighting 
terrorism tooth and claw and this effort presumably garners support and 
allies from within Ethiopia and outside of it.  Eventually, the persecution will 
establish legitimacy to the Ethiopian regime, which is subject of numerous 
criticisms and challenged by many political forces.  
 
Overstretched counterterrorism strategy and its discontent  
 Although, tackling terrorism is a daunting undertaking that needs an 
orchestrated legal, prosecutorial, intelligence, and military efforts, 
nonetheless it also needs to be a meticulous and focused task. It is a universal 
phenomenon that in the name of countering terrorism states are seen 
compromising basic rights and liberties enshrined under their legal 
system106.  
 As this paper tries to point out the application of Ethiopia’s anti-
terrorism law is an epitome of misusing counter terrorism as an excuse for 
violation of human and democratic rights as well as silencing dissidents. 
During the research period—from September 2011 to March 2017—the state 
overused the anti-terrorism law and prosecute as many as one thousand 
individuals. In a staggering majority, in more than ninety five percent of all 
the cases terrorism charges are lodged against individuals who are alleged of 
leading and abetting Ethiopian disgruntled insurgent groups. Still in third of 
all the cases, the state pressed a terrorism allegation against civilians who has 
nothing to do with either terrorism or the rebel groups.  
 Beyond this appalling persecution of dissidents, the blatant and 
abysmal misuse of the law and exploitation of the universal cause, 
                                                            
106 Supra 6 
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counterterrorism however, has far-reaching legal as well as political 
consequences.  
 The first and the foremost effect of this legally misused counter 
terrorism strategy is its bad implication to the whole notion of terrorism—
what this author calls it hackneyed terrorism. Hackneyed terrorism is an 
understanding of terrorism as an insignificant and overused act/concept. 
Because of the state’s high reliance and mis(over)using of the anti-terrorism  
law in silencing dissidents, the populace will lack the alertness as well as the 
readiness in joining counterterrorism efforts.  
 The second impact of the sweeping usage of anti-terrorism law as the 
Ethiopian case suggests ironically on the counterterrorism allies. Terrorism is 
essentially not an act that a certain lunatic did for personal reasons. Rather, it 
is deep rooted in the realm of ideology. Thus, an effective counterterrorism 
strategy calls for a wider public in tackling the ideological pillars of 
terrorism. Nevertheless, in Ethiopia, as this research finds, the state is 
targeting those individuals who should are supposed to be primary partners 
in the counterterrorism alliance—activists, writers, and revered political 
figures—by the law that is actually expected to countering terrorism. This 
backfires and it will result a long lasting effect on the overall strategy.  
 Thirdly, implementing a widely written law in an overstretched 
manner as it is implemented in Ethiopia would blow away the general 
populaces trust on the justice machinery and eventually, it will make the 
‘Criminal Justice Model’ of countering terrorism unusable. The Criminal 
Justice Model mainly intended at maintaining peace and order and 
countering terrorism in a designated community―by using criminal 
prosecutorial platforms. However, when the state weaponized laws to attack 
political foes and rebellious elements alike, using laws designed to counter 
terrorism, the trust and adherence towards the system will fade away. 
 Last but not least, the sweeping implementation of the anti-terrorism 
law against any one opposing the status quo in Ethiopia also calls for a 
growing disregard of International obligations that Ethiopia is part of. 
Among the many obligations that are worthy of insight, we found the 
Geneva Conventions on the law of war that Ethiopia is a signatory and part 
of it. In some of the terrorism charges lodged against Ethiopians citing the 
anti-terrorism law, Prisoners of War are involved. These are individuals who 
are captured in the battlefields and later indicted with terrorism, irrespective 
of their status and their individual circumstances as per the Geneva 
Conventions on law of war that covered insurgencies107. 
                                                            
107 Ethiopia is a signatory and part of all the four 1949 four Geneva Conventions on the law 
of War and among the 1977 three amendment protocols, Ethiopia is a party to the two 
protocols, in which Protocol II―relating to the Protection of Victims of Non-International 
Armed Conflicts that includes protection of insurgent groups at war―is included.  
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 Generally, though the Ethiopian anti-terrorism law is a widely opened 
toolkit of abuse, but its implementation is far reaching to the extent of 
blurring the line between what is right and what is wrong. The super majority 
of the cases studied in this research are the glaring testimonies for this 
verdict. It is self-evident that a widely written law is prone to abuse, however 
when such laws met an abusive, readymade criminal justice system and 
exclusionary and hostile political environment, the impact of such laws will 
be devastative. Ethiopia’s anti-terrorism law and its implementation is a 
prototype of such abusive instances that ultimately signifies as quintessential 
case for how not to counter terrorism. 
 
Appendix 
(The complete list of court cases assessed in this study) 
1. Abdi Kemal et al v The Federal Public Prosecutor (2 Individuals) 
2. Abdiweli Mohamed and et al v The Federal Public Prosecutor (4 Individuals) 
3. Abdulaziz Jemalet al v The Federal Public Prosecutor (5 Individuals) 
4. Abdulkerim Abdusemed et al v The Federal Public Prosecutor (6 Individuals) 
5. Abdulwahid Abdela et al v The Federal Public Prosecutor (20 Individuals) 
6. Abdulwehab Mehadi et al v The Federal Public Prosecutor (8 Individuals)  
7. Abebe Kassie et al v The Federal Public Prosecutor (5 Individuals) 
8. Abebe Temesgen et al v The Federal Public Prosecutor (10 Individuals) 
9. Abebe Urgessa et al v The Federal Public Prosecutor (6 Individuals) 
10. Abebe Yehuala et al v The Federal Public Prosecutor (4 Individuals) 
11. Abel Kebede et al v The Federal Public Prosecutor (3 Individuals) 
12. Abera Lema et al v The Federal Public prosecutor (5 Individuals) 
13. Abrham Zewdu et al v The Federal Public Prosecutor (5 Individuals) 
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